during the Industrial Revolution, that has been carried out by Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson, Knick Harley, and Nick Crafts.6 Yet, unless I have badly misread their work, none of these scholars was engaged in a nihilistic project intended to leave us huddled under a blanket with nothing but thrice-squeezed oranges to sustain us. These are solid citizens with more than a touch of positivist faith. They were interested in cleansing the temple of the "false god of the take off," not in pulling down the pillars.
If their estimates of slower eighteenth-century growth and, by implication, a larger prerevolution industrial output in Britain have loosened the tongues and set in motion the pens of a hoard of disbelievers, it is because their important work stimulated new interpretations of a growing body of research on the economic history of periods before and after, and regions outside the classic British Industrial Revolution. It is as though the pruning of a tree allowed saplings long stunted by the shadows to flourish for the first time.
The implications of these ideas-not so much new as newly emboldened to speak to audiences newly receptive to hear-go well beyond those of the revised growth measurements by themselves. This became clear to me five years ago while attending the economic history meetings held annually in Prato, Italy.7 This was to be the twentieth anniversary meeting of this "Club Med" for economic historians, so the organizers announced the theme to be a retrospective on the accomplishments of those two decades in the fields of agrarian history, demographic history, urban history, and the quantitative study of production in Early Modem times.
In desperate brevity those accomplishments include the following. Already 20 years ago the received wisdom that an agricultural revolution and the Industrial Revolution were simultaneous events gave ground to the plausible claims that a growth of agricultural output warranting the title "agricultural revolution" occurred in the century preceding the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Since then quite a large number of agricultural revolutions have been proclaimed. This profusion is confusing, but one thing is now certain: the picture of a stable world of traditional peasants stirred to new action by post-1750 improving landlords and parliamentary enclosures is lost forever.8
Perhaps the simplest way to summarize the achievements of demo- graphic history in this period is to note that no one can draw the sweeping curves of fertility and mortality decline that constitute the nineteenth-twentieth century demographic transition without pausing to note that the putative starting point of those curves, representing pretransition traditionalism, was nothing of the sort. The operations of the European marriage pattern, the high-and low-pressure demographic regimes, the minuet called dilatory homeostasis, the almost accidental uncovering of ubiquitous migration flows-all of these achievements of historical demography and yet others in the related realm of household structure have endowed early modem Europe with an important history of fertility and mortality change. It was hardly a "motionless history," even though the great enforcer-the positive checks of Malthus holding society in thrall-was not entirely absent.9
In early modem urban history we have in recent years abandoned the notion that Europe's cities, their medieval vigor dissipated, faced the unenviable choice of stagnation or syncophantism until modem industry lifted them from their torpor to inaugurate modem urbanization. I hope it is now clear that Europe's urban network, connecting its many cities in systems of commercial interaction, was an achievement of the early modem period, establishing a framework for regional economic development in which industrial growth could occur, rather than being itself a product of that industrialization.'0 Finally, the past 25 years has seen the development of a new history of industrialization before industrialization, to borrow a memorably awkward German book title. It is true, some scholars found the late Franklin Mendels' definition of "protoindustrialization" to be a concept too many, but few will deny the value of the debate around that term in exposing the submerged portion of the iceberg of prefactory industrial production, submerged in a mainly rural sea of by-employments, seasonal work, and child and female labor."
As I sat at the final tavolo rondo session of those Prato meetings, which was held in nearby Florence, the acknowledged birthplace of the Renaissance, I could not help thinking of a parallel between the scholarly achievements there being chronicled and an earlier academic movement. The claim of the Renaissance to form the origins of modern western history via its rebirth of ancient learning held within it the secondary claim that the preceding epoch had been an age of darkness, a benighted era of ignorance and barbarism. This had always rankled among medievalists, who early in this century began to mount a concerted effort to assert the medieval origins of the modern world and the secondary significance of the Renaissance, a cultural phenomenon blown all out of proportion by the genius for self advertisement of its foremost exponents. (The Renaissance is one of the few historiographical monuments to have been named at the time by its own chief advocates.) This movement of disgruntled scholars is known to historians as the "Revolt of the Medievalists," and it seemed to me that the scholarly enterprise being reviewed at that Prato meeting, an enterprise in which I have played a part these past 25 years, constituted a "Revolt of the Early Modernists." '12 With this difference. The medievalists aimed to dethrone the Renaissance, formed a movement of scholars committed to doing so-and failed. The merits of their historical arguments had to do battle with a determined resistance stiffened by powerful contemporary needs in the 1920s and 30s to uphold the Renaissance vision of a modern world founded on a rational, secular, progressivist culture and bearing the seed of modem democracy. Renaissance studies emerged from this struggle stronger than ever, experiencing a rebirth, so to speak, in the generation after World War II. The real crisis came not so much from these historical challenges as from the impact of contemporary experience on historiography. As Bouwsma puts it, "Since we are baffled by the modem world, we are hardly in a position to argue for the relevance to it, at least in the traditional way, of the Renaissance.... The collapse of the idea of progress has profoundly subverted our sense of the direction of history."'13 The Revolt of the Early Modernists, if you will entertain this conceit for a moment longer, has been a very different movement from that of the medievalists. This was no movement of angry scholars eager to drag the Industrial Revolution down from its pedestal. It wasn't a movement at all. Its participants shared, and share, I believe, an eagerness to remove the vestiges of crude modernization theory, with its traditionalmodem dualism and its linear historical models, but repeated acts of kicking open already unlatched doors is not the stuff of high drama. Thus, the agenda of early modern economic history is relatively benign with respect to the concept of the Industrial Revolution; we come not to bury it but to improve it. And yet, the Industrial Revolution is now a concept on the defensive. This crisis exists because the challenge from behind, as it were, is joined by a challenge derived from contemporary experience. nation of commercial incentives (changes in relative prices, reduced transaction costs) and changes in tastes, this "industrious revolution" emanating to a substantial degree from the aspirations of the family, preceded and prepared the way for the Industrial Revolution. This industrious revolution, a change in household behavior with important demand-side features, began in advance of the Industrial Revolution, a fundamentally supply-side phenomenon.
The household is a unit of coresidence and reproduction, of production and labor power, of consumption and distribution among its members, and of transmission across generations. At the heart of the concept of an industrious revolution is the interaction of these functions and of decision making within the household concerning the optimal allocation of time and other resources of its members. Here I adapt Gary Becker's "Theory of the Allocation of Time" to my purposes, proposing that a household purchases market-supplied goods subject to a resource constraint of money income, and combines these goods with the labor and other resources of the household to produce what Becker called "Z," the more basic commodities that directly enter the household's utility function.21 The purchased goods (x) should be thought of as ranging from items requiring very little household labor before they are transformed to the consumable Z commodities (say tea), to those (say sheep) that require extensive household labor before the transformation (to clothing) is complete. Correspondingly, the Z commodities should be thought of as items of utility, many if not all of which can be satisfied in a variety of ways-through purchased goods requiring little labor or through essentially home-produced goods and services (clothing could be produced from home-grown fiber, from a store-bought length of cloth, or ready-made from a tailor-the domestic "valueadded" diminishing with each example). If this is granted, then changes in tastes (chiefly affecting the desired 21 Becker composition of Z commodities) and supply-side changes affecting relative prices (chiefly influencing the choice of technique to achieve a given Z commodity) will jointly determine the demand for market-supplied goods. And, within the household economy, this demand will shape the disposition of the household's potential productive resources (chiefly time) between home production of Z and income-generating production of marketed commodities and the offer of labor. When the demand for leisure (defined as time devoted to neither income-generating nor consumption-preparing activity) is added to the equation, we have what I believe is a way of formulating the household economy that is sufficiently general to comprehend the proverbial preindustrial peasant household characterized by substantial self-sufficiency, and the modern household, often thought to be simply a unit of consumption.22
In this framework the industrious revolution, for which evidence can be found from the mid-seventeenth century into the early nineteenth, consisted of two transformations: the reduction of leisure time as the marginal utility of money income rose, and the reallocation of labor from goods and services for direct consumption to marketed goodsthat is, a new strategy for the maximization of household utility. We see it among peasant households concentrating their labor in marketed food production, in cottar households directing underemployed labor to protoindustrial production, in the more extensive market-oriented labor of women and children, and finally, in the pace or intensity of work.23 22 In his "Theory of the Allocation of Time" Becker presented the household as a unit that maximizes utility subject to two constraints, one on the expenditures for market-supplied goods Now, a vast body of opinion held both by contemporaries and by modem historians contradicts the very possibility of an industrious revolution such as I have described. Among eighteenth-century observers no end of colorful denunciations of the sloth, fecklessness, and irresponsibility of working people can be assembled.24 They stress the limited, and base, wants of the working population and the necessity of low wages to secure an elastic supply of labor. Such commentary is not usually the product of disinterested observation of actual behavior. It functioned as part of an ideology that defined the working population's otherness and incapacity for self-governance. In addition, of course, it had the practical benefit, as the "utility of poverty doctrine," of justifying low wages. It is ironic that many historians who regard themselves as champions of the common man appropriate these claims. What had served the original tellers as a trope to justify the subordination of the, lesser orders because of their lack of self-control and weak spirit of improvement came to be used by "moral economy" advocates as evidence of the precapitalist natural innocence of common folk.
Thus, the human raw material for a modem capitalist economy could be described by Sidney Pollard as "Men who were non-accumulative, non-acquisitive, accustomed to work for subsistence, not for maximization of income, [who] had to be made obedient to the cash stimulus, and obedient in such a way as to react precisely to the stimuli provided.' 25 The factory master not only had to train his workers, he had to train his consumers at the same time, for nothing came harder than regular and intense labor, which required in E. P. Thompson's words "the supervision of labour; fines; bells and clocks; money incentives; preachings and schooling; the suppression of fairs and sports."26
There exists another body of literature consisting primarily of novels, diaries, and essays that evokes a rather different image. From Samuel Pepys through Daniel Defoe to Arthur Young, the concem with material culture in the broadest sense is intense, if not compulsive. Indeed, Defoe might well qualify as the chronicler of the industrious revolution, so frequently does he describe manufacturing counties where "you see the wheel going almost at every door, the wool and the yam hanging up at every window, the looms, the winders, the combers, the carders, the dyers, the dressers, all busy; and the very children, as well as women constantly employed.
As is the labour so is the living; for where the poor are full of work, they are never empty of wages; they eat while the others starve, and This "tolerable plenty" that filled Defoe with admiration, translated to "luxury" for many other observers, and the bitter debate waged over its pros and cons is itself a sign that target incomes and subsistence norms no longer ruled-for the essayists and poets who waxed eloquent on this theme could hardly have been tilting at wholly fictional windmills.
The starting point of this debate might be set at the publication of the poem "Fable of the Bees" by the Dutch immigrant to England, Bernard de Mandeville. Its first version, published in 1705, immediately created a scandal with its argument that the private vices of society-pride, vanity, envy-accounted for the public benefits of industry and pros- Instead of being as before, idle, careless, indolent, envious, dissatisfied and disaffected, the fruits of their former depraved, helpless and wretched condition, they become careful and thrifty both of their money and time, and soon begin to imbibe fresh notions respecting themselves and others and are happily found to be better fathers, better husbands and more respected members of the community than they had ever been before.
But the industrious revolution is not altogether an admirable thing. The intensification of work and suppression of leisure was associated with the (sell) exploitation of family members-wives and children, the neglect of what we now call human capital formation (literacy rates stagnated in the eighteenth century), and greater recourse to binge drinking and binge leisure (the famous "Saint Monday" was no ancient practice of precapitalist "moral" workmen, it appears to have emerged after 1780).33 Finally, and more speculatively, the new pressures and possibilities to which the industrious household economy were exposed made courtship and marriage a process of less settled rules, giving rise to a great wave of illegitimacy and child abandonment in the period 1750 to 1820.34 The social ills of the industrious revolution were not the same as earlier times, but they were disturbing, nonetheless.
I have by no means exhausted the objections to the industrious revolution as a characterization of behavior and motivation; but I will now turn to another category of objection, one that focuses on the very Kingdoms by thee, to sickly greatness grown, Boast of a florid vigour not their own. At every draught more large and large they grow, A bloated mass of rank unwieldy woe; Till sapped their strength, and every part unsound, Down, down they sink, and spread a ruin round. In his recent study of a Wurttemberg peasant community experiencing an "industrious revolution" in the century after 1750, David Sabean objects to a substantialist concept of the household that treats it as a total unity.36 The household is permeable, being the locus of complex alliances and reciprocities with external agents; it is fit into hierarchical dependencies; and internally it consists of an alliance between husband and wife and implicit contracts between parents and children. Thus, to be historically useful, the economics of the household must capture the differences in household organization among classes and over time.
If the household's permeability yields to utter porosity, and if the internal decision making is the product of naked struggle among self-interested individuals, then, indeed, we had best abandon this project altogether. But even household realists such as Sabean do not go that far, although they may be skeptical of Paul Samuelson's influential approach to the problem of group utility maximization that treats the household as a "realm of altruism" (where each family member includes the utility of the other members-as defined by that member-in his or her own utility function).37 Still, this approach has the virtue of focusing attention on a process of negotiation among persons with an affective as well as a material stake in a joint enterprise. It allows for change in the relations among family members without dissolving the essential integrity of the household as an economic unit.
When the notion of the household as a small factory or a patriarchal monolith requiring no internal examination is abandoned, the historical evolution of this unit becomes a proper object of study. And here, the industrious revolution seems to have brought with it two important innovations: the first, foreshadowed in my litany of growing social ills of the eighteenth century, was a growing permeability, the result of the greater labor force participation of household members, whereby economic alliances with outsiders became more important, leading to greater individuation, default of implicit contract, and a shift of demand away from capital-forming consumption (an inelegant term) toward the consumption of nondurables. The second was an augmentation of the The industrious revolution was no sudden thing, but neither was it eternal. The tool kit of middle-level generalizations I have assembled to study its emergence allows us also to study its demise-or better its replacement by another mode of household negotiation with the larger economy. The breadwinner-homemaker household, sometimes known as capitalist patriarchy, emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century in the most advanced sectors but became a widespread household norm in the century after 1850. Its defining feature is the withdrawal of wives and children from the paid labor force and the ideal of an adult male wage sufficient to support the household (the ideology of the family wage).40 As a despairing critic of this regime put it, "By the First World War, this conception had become a pervasive and fervently held proletarian ideal throughout the developed capitalist world.",4' It may seem ironic, certainly counterintuitive, that households living in the throes of industrialization, in the hectic drive to industrial maturity, should at the margin shift demand away from market goods. Nor is it obvious why laborers supposedly cured of the backwardbending labor-supply-curve ailment should now withdraw labor from the market as real wages rose. Central to an explanation is a shift in the preference schedule that gave shape to household demand patterns and simultaneously determined the household's supply of paid labor. This gradually shifted in favor of Beckerian Z commodities, whose production required larger inputs of household time. As real earnings rose in the second half of the nineteenth century (the timing varied by social class and country), a new set of Z commodities associated with hygiene and nutrition, the health and education of children, and the achievement of new standards of domesticity and comfort in the home came to appear superior to the available range of market-provided goods and services. Their acquisition could not occur with market-supplied goods; there were no real substitutes for intensive home labor. These forms of ultimate consumption did generate a demand for complementary market-supplied goods-one thinks of housing, plumbing, furniture, cooking stoves and utensils-but the defining feature of the new demand pattern was that its achievement required the substantial withdrawal from the paid labor force of wives and children, a strategy made possible by rising adult male wages.42
Of course, it was not achieved by everyone. Many households remained too poor to act on this strategy and must have resented the imposition of compulsory schooling and the new models of female propriety. No more than the industrious household was the breadwinner-homemaker household universal. I offer both as ideal types, defining, as it were, the central tendencies of their age.43 41 Seccombe, "Patriarchy Stabilized," p. 54. 42 It is also true that the withdrawal of child and female labor tended to drive adult male wages up. Seccombe seeks to explain this process as driven by "an increasingly conservative labour movement ... [which] reacted in a narrow exclusionist fashion to the very real threat which the mass employment of women as cheap labour represented . . ." (p. 55). This tragic misstep of organized labor led to the stabilization of patriarchy in the nineteenth century and, what is perhaps worse, the alienation of feminism from Marxism in the twentieth. Missing from Seccombe's scenario is a credible motivation for a policy pursued over several generations in a wide variety of countries. His suggestion that it all occurred in reaction to the defeat of Chartism is not quite up to the task. 43 The breadwinner-homemaker household has recently come to be known as the "Ozzie and Harriet family," a label I would like to protest. I watched "Ozzie and Harriet" and recall clearly that Ozzie had no known means of support. He was always home and his work never mentioned. He did, however, send his two sons out to work for a living while they were still teenagers-with disastrous consequences for poor Ricky. My modest proposal is that people with an interest in preemptively rendering contemptuous this form of household call it the "Lucy and Desi" family. Except for one memorable day when she worked on a cream pie assembly line, Lucy stayed home, This new household production pattern had profound consequences for the entire economy. The production system became more capital intensive and more exclusively oriented to the requirements of full-time male workers;44 the structure of market demand came to focus increasingly on family-consumed rather than individually consumed goods; the goals of reproduction came, in the inelegant terms of the economist, to focus increasingly on quality-the endowment of children with human capital-and less on quantity.45 Indeed, I would go so far as to claim that it was more through the household productive system than the larger formal economy that the major achievements of industrial society-lower morbidity and mortality, better nutrition and higher educational levels, greater domestic comfort-were achieved. None of these "goods" could be bought off the shelf.
This household regime-the Lucy and Desi family-is now history. We are told every day that it no longer defines more than a small percentage of households in this country and not much more in most European countries. Since the 1960s we have embarked on a second industrious revolution. It is defined first and foremost by the unprecedented rise of married women's participation in the paid labor force (in the United States, from about 14 percent in 1940 to 60 percent in 1990), but a second important feature is the growth of teenage labor force participation rates (rising even as school attendance rises as well).46 It is further defined by a cessation in the long-term decline in weekly hours in full-time employment and, apparently, the rise of second jobs.47
The second industrious revolution differs from the first in that the household is rarely the site of production for the market, certainly not by all household members jointly, but in other respects it is reminiscent of its eighteenth-century predecessor. It occurs in an environment of stagnant or declining individual real wages and salaries; it is characterized by a rise in demand for market-supplied goods that minimize the addition of domestic "value added" (chiefly time) before ultimate consumption; demand has shifted from family-consumed durables toward individualized consumption.
I have suggested that what makes the Industrial Revolution a concept of diminished stature today is the spreading sense that the course of modern industry, whether in mature economies or developing ones, may not be directly shaped by, thus historically connected to, the First Industrial Revolution. But by my reading the industrious revolution of history is once again au courant. The Beckerian household economy framework in which I analyzed the earlier epochs of household economy seems to serve well here too, except that allowance for permeability and strains on the household must now be much greater than before. Indeed, permeability is in danger of yielding to utter porosity as the household of the second industrious revolution releases its last remaining labor reserves to the market and yields its last practical functions to market-(and government-) supplied services. What remains is then useless for transmission of assets, capricious and undependable in the distribution of consumption goods, and too unstable to effectively perform the reproduction function.48
This brings me to my conclusion. After the manner of stories I once read to my children, I offer two; the reader is free to choose.
1. One interpretation of the new industrious household-one to which I give assent in my pessimistic moments-is that the absorption into the market economy of the last remaining substance of the household represents a final frontier of capitalism, that it demonstrates the truth of Schumpeter's famous observation about the bourgeois family: "The capitalist order rests on props made of extra-capitalist material [and] derives its energy from extra-capitalist patterns of behavior which at the same time it is bound to destroy."49 2. But when I muster my courage to try to be half as good a social scientist as Schumpeter was, I have to acknowledge that his statement is tainted by the linear-modernist concept of historical change that so 48 The sociologist David Popenoe describes this process with the term "family deinstitutionalzation": "A trend for familism as a cultural value to weaken, for the family to lose functions, and for family units to become smaller, more unstable, with a shorter life span, and less cohesive." "This breeds disinvestment in the family, as rational actors direct time, money and effort to individual investments." Popenoe, Disturbing the Nest, p. 214. In terms of Gary Becker's "Theory of the Allocation of Time" (see notes 21 and 22), the "industrious" household is what he called the "full income" position, "obtained by devoting all the time and other resources of a household to earning income, with no regard for consumption" (pp. 497-98). The final phrase in this statement is, of course, unrealistic, but might be restated as "with a systematic preference for market goods that minimize home labor inputs, with a minimum of redistribution within the household, and with a minimum of human capital formation in children." 49 Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 162. much deserves critical scrutiny. The concept I have sketched here holds out the historically grounded prospect of new, yet unanticipated developments in the household economy. If permeability has not yielded irrevocably to porosity, aspirations for new Z goods can again change its character-this time, one might hope, in ways that avoid the rigid gender-based division of labor of the past, but, one might also hope, with demand patterns that once again foster the human potential of the household's members.
